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Introduction. A working paper entitled “Oil and Natural Gas Reserve Prices 1982-2002: 
Implications for Depletion and Investment Cost” was published in October 2003 (cited 
hereafter as Adelman & Watkins [2003]). Since then we have obtained data for 2003 and 
estimated oil and natural gas reserve prices for that year. We have also revised our 
previous estimates of reserve prices for 2001. 
 
 This addendum paper reports on the nature and significance of the results for 
2003 and the revisions to 2001. We have also extended the analysis by adding two new 
features.  First is the expression of reserve prices in real terms – previously we had only 
reported nominal prices. Second, we have estimated levelized or constant field prices that 
appear to underlie reserve prices, for each year. We refer to these as planning prices. 
Previously we had only published estimated growth rates in field prices from levels 
prevailing for a given year, congruent with our estimates of reserve prices. 
 
 Section 1 of this Addendum paper highlights the 2003 results. Section 2 discusses 
the revisions for year 2001. Section 3 outlines the nature of the analytical extensions, 
presents the results, and discusses what they show. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.  
 
 Adelman & Watkins [2003] included an extensive set of tables in Appendices. 
The revisions to all these tables to include 2003 and revised 2001 data are attached here 
as Appendices. 
 
This paper is to be read in conjunction with, not as a substitute for, Adelman & 
Watkins [2003]: analysis and description in the 2003 paper is not repeated here. 
 
1. Results: 2003.  
 
Transaction Characteristics. As before, the source of our data on reserve 
transactions was the Scotia Group. The number of usable transactions for 2003 was 40, 
the lowest since 19861. Of these, four were identified as outliers (for outlier criteria, see 
discussion in Adelman & Watkins [2003, pp13-14]). 
 
                                                 
1 Of the 40 transactions, 5 were ‘pure’ oil, 23 ‘pure’ gas (‘pure’ refers to transactions where only oil or gas 
reserves were identified). 
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In common with all other years of the data set, the distribution of transaction 
values was skewed to the left (though less so than for other years) and the hypothesis of 
log Normality was not rejected. The four outliers were of larger than average value: the 
mean transaction value fell from some $150mm for the 40 observations (before exclusion 
of outliers) to $120 mm for the 36 observations (after exclusion of outliers).   
 
Regression Results. Linear regression (without a constant) of all transaction 
values on oil and natural gas reserve volumes disclosed an oil reserve price of $9.87/bbl 
and $1.12/mcf for gas2. After elimination of the four outliers, the reserve prices changed 
to $8.17/bbl and $1.19/mcf respectively3.   
 
These values marked a very noticeable increase compared with 2002 of $2.43/bbl 
or about 40 per cent for oil, $0.31/mcf or 35 per cent for gas (variation is for results after 
exclusion of outliers)4. 
 
Reserve Status. As in Adelman & Watkins [2003] tests were made of whether 
reserves were on production or not would influence reserve values. In the case of oil, the 
2003 observation set (excluding outliers) did not provide evidence that reserves on 
production exhibited higher values than those that were seemingly fallow. In contrast, for 
gas the conclusion was that shut-in reserves had higher reserve prices than those on 
production. If valid, we ascribe this result to expected appreciation of in-ground reserves 
by the time they are produced, without dilution by interim production. 
 
Influence of R/P Ratio. Year 2003 did not provide evidence that, other things 
equal, the higher the R/P ratio, the lower the reserve price. In the case of oil, although the 
coefficient intended to detect any such influence had the expected sign, it was 
insignificant; for gas the corresponding coefficient was virtually zero. 
 
Reserve Prices and Field Prices. Our interest here relates to the influence of field 
prices (prices for flowing oil) on in-ground prices. Addition of 2003 to the regression of 
reserve prices on contemporary prices, prices lagged one year, and prices lagged two 
years did not appreciably affect the earlier results. Oil reserve prices remained positively 
and significantly affected by field prices: about 15 per cent of any change in field prices 
would be reflected in reserve prices (but the degree of linear fit of the three oil equations 
remained modest).  
 
Natural gas reserve prices were positively related to field prices; moreover, in the 
case of contemporary prices and prices lagged one year, the coefficient was now 
significant; about 10 per cent of any change in field prices would be reflected in reserve 
prices (as before, the linear fit remained trivial).  
                                                 
2The adjusted R2 was 0.93. Both reserve values were strongly significant. Estimation of the equation with 
an intercept revealed it was not significant. 
3Adjusted R2 was 0.97; both reserve coefficients highly significant. An intercept, when inserted in the 
equation, was found to be negative and significant. However, it had little impact on the reserve coefficients 
in comparison with its value when the intercept was suppressed. 
4 The results on reserve prices are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
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Reserve Prices and Hotelling Values. Hotelling’s valuation principle (HVP) sees 
the in-ground price of a mineral as equal to the prevailing net field price (field price less 
operating cost). The 2003 Hotelling oil reserve value was more than double our estimated 
reserve price, equivalent to over 20 standard deviations above it. As with almost every 
other year, the results for 2003 do not support the HVP. The conclusions for gas were 
similar: the ratio for the HV to the reserve price was 2.7, representing a spread between 
them of 32 standard deviations.  
 
Implicit Growth Rates in Prices. Implicit growth rates in field prices embedded in 
reserve prices can be estimated, given some simplifying assumptions. For oil, the reserve 
price in 2003 of $8.17/bl did not seem to anticipate any change in field prices, up or 
down (the 95 per cent confidence interval was about three percentage points either side). 
The natural gas value of $1.45/mcf appeared to reflect a seven per cent annual reduction 
in field prices (the confidence interval was a symmetrical two percentage points)5. 
 
Returns to Holding Reserves. The HVP implies in-ground prices increase in 
adjacent years at industry’s discount rate. In 2003, the rise in both oil and gas reserve 
prices exceeded the discount associated with minimum risk by a considerable margin.  
 
2. Revised Results: 2001.  
 
The results for 2001 as published in Adelman & Watkins [2003] showed an 
increase in reserve values over year 2000 values of about 19 per cent in the case of oil, 
but more than doubled in the case of natural gas (which then fell as dramatically in 2002). 
The numbers quoted related to the equation without a constant and excluding outliers6.  
 
 Such an unusual spike in natural gas prices suggested revisiting the underlying 
transaction data. We examined all the 61 observations used in Adelman & Watkins 
[2003] to check again for irregularities, unusual values, transactions that involved 
international assets, transactions that employed  ‘barrels of oil equivalence’ and so forth.  
 
This additional scrutiny identified 11 observations of doubtful parentage, and 
these were added to the list of excluded transactions. Hence the original 61 observations 
were reduced to 50. Of the 50, four were identified as outliers, leaving 46 observations 
after their exclusion. Of the original 61 observations, nine outliers had been identified, 
leaving 52 observations after outliers. Thus the difference between the original number of 
observations excluding outliers and the corresponding revised number is six (52 less 46). 
Hence of the original observations, on a net basis five outliers (9 less 4) were 
subsequently eliminated from the data set7.  
 
                                                 
5 In Section 3 we estimate implicit levelized field prices embedded in reserve prices. 
6 See Table B-2a, Adelman &Watkins [2003, p66]. 
7 It so happens that these five observations identified as outliers in Adelman & Watkins [2003] were five of 
the 11 observations eliminated from the data set in the review.   
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Transaction Characteristics. The reduced data set did not shift the leftward 
distribution of transaction values; log Normality would not be rejected for the 50 
observation set. The four outliers were of larger than average value: the mean transaction 
value fell from $127mm for the 52 observations to $101mm for the 46 observations. And 
in physical terms, the mean reserve sizes fell.  
 
Regression Results. Linear regression (without a constant) of the 50 transaction 
values on oil and natural gas reserve volumes disclosed an oil reserve value of $6.40/bl 
and $1.32/mcf for gas8. After elimination of the four outliers, these reserve values 
changed to $5.75/bl and $1.45/mcf respectively9.   
 
The revised year 2001 oil reserve value of $5.75/bbl (after exclusion of outliers) 
was an increase of about a third over the original value of $4.21/bbl in Adelman & 
Watkins [2003]. The natural gas reserve value fell from $1.68/mcf to $1.45/mcf, or by 
some 15 per cent. In short, the original analysis tended to underestimate oil reserve values 
but overestimate gas reserve values.  
 
Reserves Status. Tests of whether reserve prices were influenced by reserves 
being on production or not disclosed no evidence that reserves on production exhibited 
higher in-ground values than those seemingly fallow. In the case of oil this result was 
consistent with the original results; in contrast, for gas the original results had suggested 
that shut-in reserves had significantly higher reserve prices than those on production. 
 
Influence of R/P Ratio. For oil, the coefficient intended to detect whether R/P 
ratios influenced reserve values now had the expected (negative) sign, although it was 
insignificant (in the original results it had been positive but insignificant). For gas, the 
corresponding coefficient remained negative and significant. 
 
Reserve Prices and Field Prices. The revised 2001 reserve prices had little impact 
on the results after inclusion of year 2003, reported on above. For oil, the effect of a 
change in field prices on reserve prices went up slightly to 16 per cent, and the degree of 
equation fit improved marginally. For gas, there was no appreciable change.  
 
Reserve Prices and Hotelling Values. The ratio of the Hotelling value to the oil 
reserve prices remained well over two (2.5), although falling from 3.4 beforehand. The 
spread between the two values was 8.7 standard deviations, a result that continued to 
provide no support for the HVP.  In the case of gas the ratio increased from 1.6 originally 
to 1.8, with a spread of 7.5 standard deviations – again, no support for the HVP. 
 
Implicit Growth Rates in Prices. The revised 2001 oil reserve price was 
associated with an increase in the implicit annual growth rate in field prices from minus 
                                                 
8The adjusted R2 was 0.98. Both reserve values were strongly significant. When the equation was estimated 
with an intercept, the latter was insignificant. 
9Adjusted R2 was 0.97; both reserve coefficients highly significant. An intercept, when inserted in the 
equation, was found to be negative and significant. However, it had little impact on the reserve coefficients 
estimated when it was suppressed. 
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nine per cent to minus two per cent (the 95 per cent confidence interval was wide at about 
10 percentage points either side). The natural gas value of $1.45/mcf suggested a two per 
cent annual growth rate in field price, below the four per cent previously (the confidence 
interval is about a symmetric four percentage points, modestly higher than beforehand). 
 
Returns to Holding Reserves. The increase in the oil reserve value enhances the 
‘surplus’ apparent achieved risk premium over minimum levels already observed with the 
original data. In the case of natural gas, the achieved risk premium fell with the lower gas 
reserve value, but still remained comfortably above minimum levels.  
   
3. Extensions to Analysis. 
 
 In this section we report on reserve prices after adjustment for inflation and 
comment on the trends revealed. We also specify estimation of levelized field prices and 
review those results. 
 
Reserve Values after Adjustment for Inflation. In Adelman & Watkins [2003] all 
estimated reserve values were shown in money-of-the day terms. Now we display them 
also in real terms. To do this, three indexes were considered: the US Consumer Price 
Index (CPP); the US GDP Price Index (GDPPI); and the US Producer Price Index (PPI). 
Reserve values are an alternative to piecemeal sales at wholesale prices, hence a retail 
price index would not be suitable. The GDPPI is preferable to the CPI, but its breadth is a 
disadvantage here. The PPI was selected as the best option.    
 
The oil reserve values in $/bbl are shown in Table 1 and plotted in Figure 1; those 
for natural gas (in $/mcf) are listed in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 2.  The estimates in 
the tables and plots are with outliers excluded and without an intercept. They are shown 
in both nominal and real terms, with the adjustment for inflation made by applying the 
US producer price index (2003 = 1.0). Adjustments using the GDPPI or CPI index 
resulted in higher real values than under the PPI. 
 
Figure 1 reveals no visible secular trend in oil reserve prices, 1982-2003. 
Sometimes prices fall, sometimes they rise, as they have recently – but to levels in 2003 
only marginally higher than at the previous peak in 1985 in money-of-the-day terms.  
 
In real terms, oil prices tended to fall from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s. 
Between then and year 2000 they were quite flat. Since year 2000 reserve prices have 
moved to distinctly higher levels, as field prices used in company evaluations have 
increased. This registered OPEC’s new found quota discipline and resulting ability to 
keep wellhead prices comfortably above $20/bbl. Nevertheless the estimated 2003 oil 
reserve price after adjustment for inflation is still around 20 per cent below the 1985 
peak.  
 
Figure 2 shows close to a plateau in natural gas reserve prices from 1986 to year 
2000 in terms of money-of-the-day. Since then they have risen, including an unusual blip 
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in 2001. The 2003 natural gas reserve price remains below real levels of the mid 1980s 
(excepting 2001).   
  
            
Table 1: Estimates of In-Ground Crude Oil Prices, United States, 1982-2003 
(nominal and real terms) 
  In-Ground Oil Price   In-Ground Oil Price 
Year ($US/bbl) Year ($US/bbl) 
  Nominal $ $2003 (1)   Nominal $ $2003 (1) 
1982 7.13 10.22 1993 3.54 4.07 
1983 3.37 4.75 1994 2.9 3.31 
1984 6.95 9.6 1995 3.81 4.27 
1985 7.74 10.6 1996 3.67 4.00 
1986 5.10 7.08 1997 5.01 5.45 
1987 4.40 5.98 1998 2.85 3.12 
1988 5.69 7.55 1999 3.59 3.87 
1989 4.61 5.81 2000 3.55 3.68 
1990 3.64 4.38 2001 5.75 5.85 
1991 4.44 5.23 2002 5.74 5.92 
1992 4.14 4.81 2003 8.17 8.17 
        
     (1)  Expressed in US$2003 using US Producer Price Index    
     Source: Adelman & Watkins [2003, Table B-2a] and Adelman & Watkins [2005].   
            
 
            
Table 2: Estimates of In-Ground Natural Gas Prices, United States, 1982-2003 
(nominal and real terms) 
  Natural Gas Price   Natural Gas Price 
Year ($US/bbl) Year ($US/bbl) 
  Nominal $ $2003 (1)   Nominal $ $2003 (1) 
1982 0.36 0.51 1993 0.87 1 
1983 0.64 0.91 1994 0.77 0.88 
1984 0.86 1.19 1995 0.60 0.68 
1985 0.52 0.72 1996 0.69 0.75 
1986 0.96 1.34 1997 0.93 1.01 
1987 1.02 1.39 1998 0.62 0.68 
1988 0.99 1.31 1999 0.67 0.73 
1989 0.88 1.11 2000 0.75 0.78 
1990 0.90 1.08 2001 1.45 1.48 
1991 0.87 1.02 2002 0.88 0.91 
1992 0.82 0.96 2003 1.19 1.19 
        
     (1)  Expressed in US$2003 using US Producer Price Index    
     Source: Adelman & Watkins [2003, Table B-2a] and Adelman & Watkins [2005].   
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 Levelized Field Prices Implicit in Reserve Prices. In Adelman & Watkins [2003], for 
any given level of reserve prices we derived implicit field price expectations. The 
approximation was expressed as expected growth rates from prevailing field prices – 
negative or positive.  
 
Another way of looking at field prices seemingly embedded in reserve prices is to 
express them as equivalent constant prices, that is, as levelized prices over the reserve’s 
life. This approach has more in common with industry practice in evaluating reserve 
properties of adopting a flat price for estimating cash flow, rather than to assume a price 
trend. The flat price might be in nominal or real terms. The industry vernacular refers to 
price used for project appraisal as the ‘price deck’.  
 
After making some simplifying assumptions, the general expression for the 
uniform ‘planning’ price implicit in the price of a reserve in the ground is given by: 
 
PL = V(a + i)/a + c.                                                                      (1). 
 
where PL = uniform planning field price  
 a = production decline rate, percentage per year 
             i = discount rate 
            V = reserve price 
             c = unit extraction cost. 
 
This formula can be derived from expression (6) in Adelman & Watkins [2003, p32] after 
setting g, the growth rate equal to zero, and then solving for price10.  
 
 The results of applying (1) are shown in Table 3 for both oil and natural gas.  The 
respective series are plotted in Figures 3 (oil) and 4 (gas). Each plot also shows actual 
field prices. 
 
 From the mid 1980s to the late 1990s fixed planning prices for oil were close to 
actual prices; but from 1999 to 2002 planning prices were consistently below actual 
prices – the implication was that parties making oil reserve transactions did not see 
realized field prices as being sustainable. In 2002 and especially 2003 that mood had 
seemingly changed, and indeed in 2003 oil planning prices approximated actual prices.  
 
 In the case of natural gas, from the mid-1980s to the mid 1990s planning prices 
were consistently above actual field prices, an indication that corporations misjudged the 
impact of deregulation. From the mid 1990s on, there was a close approximation between 
planning and actual prices, except in 2003, when actual field prices appreciably exceeded 
planning prices.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The planning prices estimated from equation (1) are related to those expressed in terms of growth rates 
(see earlier) in the following way: an expected positive growth rate in field prices would be associated with 





            
Table 3: Oil and Natural Gas Planning Prices, 1982-2003










1982 37.70 2.39 1993 13.20 2.65 
1983 20.28 3.52 1994 12.14 2.50 
1984 33.76 4.54 1995 14.57 1.96 
1985 33.33 2.90 1996 15.53 2.32 
1986 17.83 3.64 1997 18.29 2.90 
1987 17.54 3.84 1998 10.37 1.96 
1988 20.97 3.73 1999 13.85 2.19 
1989 19.16 3.11 2000 18.33 2.93 
1990 17.92 3.16 2001 20.66 4.37 
1991 18.29 2.94 2002 19.84 2.73 
1992 16.23 2.67 2003 26.45 3.96 
            
 
 
  Figure 3: Oil Planning Prices (Derived from Reserve 































   Figure 4: Natural Gas Planning Prices (Derived from 
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4. Concluding Remarks.   
 
 Addition of the year 2003 to the data base, and revisions to previous estimates of 
reserve prices for 2001 do not alter the main character of the results in Adelman & 
Watkins [2003]. This applies to our findings on the influence of reserves status, R/P 
ratios and field prices on reserve prices. The Hotelling Valuation Principle continues to 
provide little or no clue on what industry pays for in-ground reserves. 
 
 Yet the reserve prices estimated for 2003 do inject new information on how 
industry is valuing reserve assets. The strong rise in oil reserve prices provides a clear 
indication that field prices in the mid $20s per barrel are viewed more as a floor than as a 
ceiling, and that prices in the teens are not countenanced. This picture is illustrated by the 
estimates of planning prices underlying the prices paid for developed reserves. 
 
 It also follows that if development costs have increased to a lesser degree than the 
40 per cent increase in reserve prices estimated in 2003, then an additional margin is 
available to cover finding costs – increasing the attraction of more expensive sources of 
reserve additions.  
 
 Reassessment of reserve prices in 2001 suggested our earlier estimates were too 
low in for oil, too high for natural gas. Although we are now carrying a lower reserve 
price for natural gas, the sharp blip in comparison with year 2000 remains. This seems to 
be attributable to euphoria over the strong increases in field prices after 1999, before a 
collapse in 2002. 
 10
 
 Some might conclude that the increase in oil reserve prices in 2003 was evidence 
of nascent shortages. This inference would be false. Tighter world supply and resulting 
higher prices demonstrated OPEC’s improved ability to control a surplus, not its 
extinction. Greater OPEC discipline was not lost on market participants – it translated in 
to amounts paid for reserves in the ground, amounts that were still below those paid in 
1985, in real terms. 
 
 Explanation of higher prices being paid for natural gas reserves in 2003 does not 
parallel that for oil. While more of an international market is just being to emerge for 
natural gas, by far the main determinant of prices remains the conditions in North 












Table A-1: Number of Identified Transactions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
All Inclusive Number of Outliers Excluding Outliers
Year All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas
All Years 1592 345 435 106 32 29 1486 313 406
1982 14 1 0 1 0 0 13 1 0
1983 22 2 1 1 0 0 21 2 1
1984 34 8 1 3 1 0 31 7 1
1985 35 5 4 1 0 0 34 5 4
1986 27 3 3 2 0 0 25 3 3
1987 51 12 5 2 2 0 49 10 5
1988 66 14 9 2 1 0 64 13 9
1989 104 19 18 5 1 0 99 18 18
1990 160 38 29 9 3 2 151 35 27
1991 101 20 18 7 1 0 94 19 18
1992 92 20 20 6 2 2 86 18 18
1993 122 28 28 7 1 2 115 27 26
1994 98 17 33 6 2 2 92 15 31
1995 124 35 33 10 5 2 114 30 31
1996 100 31 31 6 1 2 94 30 29
1997 72 16 27 5 3 1 67 13 26
1998 91 19 45 8 3 3 83 16 42
1999 62 13 26 5 1 2 57 12 24
2000 70 15 28 4 1 2 66 14 26
2001 50 10 17 4 1 3 46 9 14
2002 57 14 36 8 3 4 49 11 32
2003 40 5 23 4 0 2 36 5 21
Outliers are defined as follows:
For pure transactions, a reserve price more than two standard deviations for that year.
For mixed transactions, a transaction value more than two standard deviations away from the fitted 
value.
Transactions of value less than $0.55 per barrel or $0.10 per mcf, or greater than $27.50 per barrel 
or $5 per mcf.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-2: Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, All Transactions
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 99.5 276.9 16.6 2.70 4.80 30.21 --- 1592
1982 480.4 1569.7 38.0 3.27 3.32 12.04 Not Rejected 14
1983 103.7 224.3 14.4 2.16 2.37 7.13 Not Rejected 22
1984 979.0 2918.8 39.2 2.98 3.32 12.93 Not Rejected 34
1985 232.5 913.1 17.4 3.93 5.41 31.07 Not Rejected 35
1986 133.7 243.6 10.5 1.82 1.99 5.98 Not Rejected 27
1987 36.9 100.4 7.0 2.72 4.89 28.99 Not Rejected 51
1988 95.4 343.2 7.2 3.60 6.22 44.65 Not Rejected 66
1989 40.8 106.5 8.1 2.61 5.51 38.79 Not Rejected 104
1990 30.3 80.3 5.6 2.65 4.77 29.41 Not Rejected 160
1991 29.1 85.2 5.0 2.92 4.71 25.56 Not Rejected 101
1992 39.7 134.6 5.2 3.39 6.92 56.16 Not Rejected 92
1993 37.9 115.7 7.0 3.06 6.81 56.70 Not Rejected 122
1994 38.8 90.6 9.7 2.33 4.02 20.01 Not Rejected 98
1995 32.8 74.5 8.3 2.27 4.09 21.61 Not Rejected 124
1996 35.5 93.8 11.0 2.64 5.88 41.81 Not Rejected 100
1997 120.1 238.2 26.4 1.98 4.22 24.18 Not Rejected 72
1998 114.0 494.6 17.0 4.34 6.41 42.60 Not Rejected 91
1999 35.0 54.8 14.5 1.57 2.65 9.38 Not Rejected 62
2000 216.2 600.3 23.9 2.78 4.73 25.84 Not Rejected 70
2001 239.0 597.9 42.5 2.50 3.26 12.45 Not Rejected 50
2002 178.4 326.1 62.0 1.83 2.97 11.89 Not Rejected 57
2003 150.5 145.3 106.0 0.97 0.99 3.02 Not Rejected 40
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-3: Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 47.4 90.4 15.0 1.72 2.87 12.58 --- 1486
1982 61.2 63.2 32.0 1.03 0.76 1.90 Not Rejected 13
1983 74.5 182.2 13.8 2.45 3.20 12.48 Not Rejected 21
1984 320.2 1047.2 33.7 3.27 4.66 24.10 Not Rejected 31
1985 80.5 161.2 16.8 2.00 2.97 11.02 Not Rejected 34
1986 78.2 143.2 10.1 1.83 1.86 4.89 Not Rejected 25
1987 19.8 35.8 6.0 1.81 2.81 10.23 Not Rejected 49
1988 56.3 142.9 6.7 2.54 3.66 15.73 Not Rejected 64
1989 28.3 59.7 8.0 2.11 4.99 34.37 Not Rejected 99
1990 16.8 32.3 5.0 1.93 3.12 12.33 Not Rejected 151
1991 13.5 22.6 5.0 1.67 2.82 11.39 Not Rejected 94
1992 19.0 33.6 4.4 1.77 2.85 11.85 Not Rejected 86
1993 20.4 31.8 7.0 1.56 2.77 11.32 Not Rejected 115
1994 20.0 29.6 8.2 1.48 2.59 9.95 Not Rejected 92
1995 19.1 31.2 8.0 1.64 2.89 11.29 Not Rejected 114
1996 20.7 28.2 10.5 1.36 2.90 13.11 Not Rejected 94
1997 85.5 120.8 25.1 1.41 1.72 5.39 Not Rejected 67
1998 42.3 55.5 17.0 1.31 1.82 5.63 Not Rejected 83
1999 22.4 24.0 13.7 1.07 1.61 5.16 Not Rejected 57
2000 116.0 209.3 22.0 1.80 2.42 8.05 Not Rejected 66
2001 101.0 217.2 32.2 2.15 4.76 28.23 Not Rejected 46
2002 106.7 141.9 60.0 1.33 2.63 10.44 Not Rejected 49
2003 119.9 112.5 95.5 0.94 0.87 2.72 Not Rejected 36
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-4: Summary Statistics for Pure Oil Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
1982 159.3 --- 159.3 --- --- --- --- 1
1983 14.0 17.6 14.0 1.26 0.00 1.00 Not Rejected 2
1984 263.4 633.7 18.7 2.41 2.04 5.16 Not Rejected 7
1985 8.3 10.4 4.2 1.25 1.34 3.01 Not Rejected 5
1986 32.9 43.9 15.0 1.33 0.62 1.50 Not Rejected 3
1987 4.2 6.6 1.7 1.56 2.43 7.34 Not Rejected 10
1988 79.6 189.3 2.9 2.38 2.48 7.80 Not Rejected 13
1989 21.3 47.5 3.5 2.23 3.15 12.06 Not Rejected 18
1990 10.1 27.6 1.3 2.72 4.72 25.64 Not Rejected 35
1991 14.6 24.1 2.9 1.65 1.70 4.19 Not Rejected 19
1992 12.3 28.4 2.4 2.30 2.95 10.56 Not Rejected 18
1993 13.8 15.1 7.8 1.09 1.55 4.89 Not Rejected 27
1994 19.7 29.7 6.2 1.51 2.00 6.07 Not Rejected 15
1995 18.4 39.4 2.6 2.14 2.95 10.61 Not Rejected 30
1996 19.5 33.5 8.7 1.72 3.44 15.44 Not Rejected 30
1997 93.2 122.0 18.7 1.31 1.08 2.46 Not Rejected 13
1998 48.9 51.4 36.3 1.05 1.46 4.78 Not Rejected 16
1999 15.1 21.4 7.5 1.42 1.79 4.71 Not Rejected 12
2000 57.5 106.6 11.6 1.85 2.32 7.51 Not Rejected 14
2001 21.3 35.0 4.0 1.64 1.62 4.19 Not Rejected 9
2002 157.0 213.3 58.0 1.36 1.98 5.94 Not Rejected 11
2003 85.3 118.1 46.1 1.38 1.44 3.17 Not Rejected 5
--- Insufficient data points.
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-5: Summary Statistics for Pure Natural Gas Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
1982 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0
1983 7.5 --- 7.5 --- --- --- --- 1
1984 294.0 --- 294.0 --- --- --- --- 1
1985 72.0 54.9 64.8 0.76 0.43 1.97 Not Rejected 4
1986 137.6 231.6 4.3 1.68 0.71 1.50 Not Rejected 3
1987 9.2 7.9 7.3 0.86 1.10 2.77 Not Rejected 5
1988 83.1 237.0 3.2 2.85 2.47 7.12 Not Rejected 9
1989 25.0 40.8 5.7 1.63 2.22 6.74 Not Rejected 18
1990 18.1 31.1 4.3 1.72 2.25 7.01 Not Rejected 27
1991 26.5 38.5 9.4 1.45 1.57 3.97 Not Rejected 18
1992 9.5 14.5 3.1 1.52 2.02 6.46 Not Rejected 18
1993 28.2 41.1 6.6 1.46 2.08 7.12 Not Rejected 26
1994 20.3 34.1 7.4 1.68 2.82 11.00 Not Rejected 31
1995 24.9 31.2 11.4 1.25 1.94 5.80 Not Rejected 31
1996 24.5 29.8 12.1 1.22 2.20 7.34 Not Rejected 29
1997 58.6 95.3 22.6 1.63 2.26 6.80 Not Rejected 26
1998 42.5 49.8 19.8 1.17 1.71 5.55 Not Rejected 42
1999 26.6 26.7 18.2 1.00 1.34 4.25 Not Rejected 24
2000 146.8 227.6 44.3 1.55 2.11 6.55 Not Rejected 26
2001 60.1 104.5 28.9 1.74 2.80 9.82 Not Rejected 14
2002 92.5 123.0 56.8 1.33 2.18 7.21 Not Rejected 32
2003 118.9 119.5 100.00 1.01 1.12 3.22 Not Rejected 21
--- Insufficient data points.
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-6: Summary Statistics for Size of Oil Reserves, All Transactions
[Millions of Barrels, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 9.8 37.4 0.5 3.36 5.42 38.06 --- 1592
1982 53.3 181.7 1.7 3.41 3.32 12.04 Not Rejected 14
1983 12.8 28.8 0.8 2.25 2.24 6.54 Not Rejected 22
1984 137.3 477.7 2.0 3.48 3.66 14.69 Rejected 34
1985 24.2 115.6 0.6 4.78 5.54 32.14 Not Rejected 35
1986 7.4 16.5 0.4 2.22 2.96 11.55 Not Rejected 27
1987 4.7 16.8 0.5 3.62 4.85 25.69 Not Rejected 51
1988 5.7 18.6 0.6 3.27 4.92 27.53 Not Rejected 66
1989 2.2 4.4 0.5 2.02 4.00 22.74 Not Rejected 104
1990 3.1 13.9 0.3 4.47 7.68 68.52 Not Rejected 160
1991 2.2 7.5 0.2 3.44 6.18 46.48 Not Rejected 101
1992 3.7 12.1 0.4 3.25 5.49 35.73 Not Rejected 92
1993 2.1 4.5 0.4 2.07 3.91 21.96 Not Rejected 122
1994 3.6 10.8 0.3 3.00 5.20 33.14 Not Rejected 98
1995 3.8 16.1 0.3 4.17 8.37 81.30 Not Rejected 124
1996 3.1 6.9 0.3 2.26 3.36 14.22 Not Rejected 100
1997 12.8 47.4 0.8 3.70 6.96 54.47 Not Rejected 72
1998 20.6 118.7 0.0 5.76 7.10 54.08 Not Rejected 91
1999 1.9 5.3 0.3 2.86 5.20 33.12 Not Rejected 62
2000 22.2 111.2 0.3 5.02 6.54 46.88 Not Rejected 70
2001 5.9 14.3 0.3 2.42 4.02 20.56 Not Rejected 50
2002 9.3 24.2 0.0 2.61 3.65 16.56 Not Rejected 57
2003 6.6 8.2 3.6 1.26 2.35 8.32 Not Rejected 40
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-7: Summary Statistics for Size of Natural Gas Reserves, All Transactions
[BCFs, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 58.1 153.7 9.9 2.65 4.64 29.49 --- 1592
1982 178.3 564.7 9.9 3.17 3.27 11.82 Not Rejected 14
1983 59.9 181.0 3.6 3.02 3.78 16.34 Not Rejected 22
1984 414.1 1259.9 13.8 3.04 3.29 12.63 Not Rejected 34
1985 109.3 366.9 10.8 5.26 5.04 27.95 Not Rejected 35
1986 111.0 229.3 7.0 2.07 2.35 7.55 Not Rejected 27
1987 14.4 24.0 4.9 1.67 2.22 7.11 Not Rejected 51
1988 57.5 220.8 3.6 3.84 5.94 40.41 Not Rejected 66
1989 30.3 72.9 7.8 2.41 4.85 29.51 Not Rejected 104
1990 23.3 80.5 3.2 3.45 7.57 68.64 Not Rejected 160
1991 19.9 55.1 2.7 2.76 4.24 21.12 Not Rejected 101
1992 26.7 94.5 4.0 3.54 6.09 40.45 Not Rejected 92
1993 26.9 63.5 3.9 2.36 3.85 19.30 Not Rejected 122
1994 23.3 49.2 4.7 2.11 3.37 14.50 Not Rejected 98
1995 24.5 55.0 3.5 2.24 3.49 15.87 Not Rejected 124
1996 24.6 54.8 4.9 2.23 5.42 40.05 Rejected 100
1997 71.1 154.1 11.1 2.17 4.20 24.31 Not Rejected 72
1998 57.3 180.4 11.9 3.15 7.32 62.11 Rejected 91
1999 32.7 54.6 11.1 1.67 2.58 9.53 Not Rejected 62
2000 141.4 349.1 15.5 2.47 4.31 24.39 Not Rejected 70
2001 154.5 439.5 21.2 2.84 3.68 15.47 Not Rejected 50
2002 104.9 234.8 26.1 2.24 4.18 23.45 Not Rejected 57
2003 121.8 121.2 102.0 0.99 1.87 8.09 Not Rejected 40
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-8: Summary Statistics for Reserve Size in Thermal Equivalence, All Transactions
[Trillion BTUs, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 111.1 315.5 19.7 2.52 4.68 28.84 --- 1592
1982 471.4 1562.3 27.0 3.31 3.31 12.01 Not Rejected 14
1983 130.5 305.8 11.5 2.34 2.72 9.63 Not Rejected 22
1984 1169.4 3746.3 28.6 3.20 3.50 14.06 Not Rejected 34
1985 242.3 998.4 18.0 4.12 5.41 31.05 Not Rejected 35
1986 151.8 291.3 11.0 1.92 2.26 7.27 Not Rejected 27
1987 39.9 95.0 9.4 2.38 4.12 20.55 Not Rejected 51
1988 88.8 288.2 10.7 3.25 5.71 38.84 Not Rejected 66
1989 42.4 83.2 13.3 1.96 4.24 24.40 Not Rejected 104
1990 40.4 119.9 8.1 2.97 5.55 37.44 Not Rejected 160
1991 31.9 88.8 5.7 2.78 5.01 29.96 Not Rejected 101
1992 47.1 144.4 8.1 3.07 6.23 45.98 Not Rejected 92
1993 38.7 79.1 11.6 2.04 3.94 19.44 Not Rejected 122
1994 43.2 89.3 13.3 2.07 4.45 27.45 Not Rejected 98
1995 45.7 103.8 10.6 2.27 5.33 39.92 Not Rejected 124
1996 41.4 78.4 17.5 1.89 5.57 41.67 Not Rejected 100
1997 141.6 315.5 31.4 2.23 4.80 27.92 Not Rejected 72
1998 170.6 747.5 24.0 4.38 6.43 43.14 Not Rejected 91
1999 42.9 58.2 21.1 1.36 2.20 7.30 Not Rejected 62
2000 263.3 778.9 31.5 2.96 4.93 27.34 Not Rejected 70
2001 187.0 449.4 41.8 2.40 3.37 13.44 Not Rejected 50
2002 155.9 250.0 66.0 1.60 3.27 16.21 Not Rejected 57
2003 121.9 119.7 99.5 0.98 1.75 7.52 Not Rejected 40
Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs)
Thermal equivalence factor of 5.5 million BTUs per barrel used.
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table A-9: Summary Statistics for Reserve Size in Thermal Equivalence, Excluding Outliers
[Trillion BTUs, where relevant]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 53.0 98.5 17.6 1.65 2.83 12.46 --- 1486
1982 54.4 84.9 26.3 1.56 2.35 7.64 Not Rejected 13
1983 107.3 293.0 9.7 2.73 3.26 12.65 Not Rejected 21
1984 298.6 1060.8 28.5 3.55 4.87 25.87 Not Rejected 31
1985 76.1 177.1 17.3 2.33 4.11 20.45 Not Rejected 34
1986 81.9 148.9 10.8 1.82 1.87 4.94 Not Rejected 25
1987 22.5 34.6 8.1 1.54 2.29 7.13 Not Rejected 49
1988 57.9 139.8 9.8 2.41 3.66 15.84 Not Rejected 64
1989 33.8 60.0 12.5 1.78 4.32 27.64 Not Rejected 99
1990 20.9 39.7 7.3 1.89 3.65 18.07 Not Rejected 151
1991 16.2 25.6 5.5 1.58 2.72 10.99 Not Rejected 94
1992 24.6 39.3 7.4 1.59 2.55 9.60 Not Rejected 86
1993 25.8 36.3 11.0 1.41 2.36 8.75 Not Rejected 115
1994 28.3 42.1 12.6 1.49 2.47 8.72 Not Rejected 92
1995 28.6 47.8 10.2 1.67 2.94 11.96 Rejected 114
1996 30.9 36.3 17.1 1.17 1.92 6.41 Not Rejected 94
1997 94.4 121.5 30.0 1.29 1.70 5.90 Not Rejected 67
1998 61.0 87.5 23.8 1.43 2.61 11.00 Not Rejected 83
1999 31.0 34.1 21.0 1.10 1.89 6.48 Not Rejected 57
2000 137.5 243.7 23.9 1.77 2.71 10.57 Not Rejected 66
2001 85.4 164.0 39.0 1.92 4.72 28.15 Not Rejected 46
2002 110.9 144.8 59.9 1.31 2.04 6.52 Not Rejected 49
2003 100.0 86.2 73.0 0.86 0.62 2.27 Not Rejected 36
Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs)
Thermal equivalence factor of 5.5 million BTUs per barrel used.
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-1a: Regression Results for All Transactions (No Constant)





($/mcf) t-stat Adjusted R 2
1982 14 7.59 11.03 0.35 1.58 0.99
1983 22 4.35 6.89 0.65 6.19 0.92
1984 34 3.71 31.85 1.02 23.36 0.99
1985 35 5.62 12.72 0.73 5.38 0.99
1986 27 2.12 3.26 0.97 21.16 0.97
1987 51 5.60 27.45 0.94 7.38 0.94
1988 66 6.07 22.13 1.20 51.47 0.99
1989 104 4.60 5.38 1.21 22.58 0.88
1990 160 4.18 21.33 0.48 14.49 0.84
1991 101 3.35 11.18 1.16 28.97 0.97
1992 92 6.34 28.07 0.75 25.82 0.98
1993 122 2.60 2.26 1.49 18.08 0.83
1994 98 5.59 13.28 0.74 8.36 0.81
1995 124 3.16 24.01 0.88 24.44 0.91
1996 100 6.98 14.71 0.95 15.92 0.90
1997 72 2.88 19.48 1.13 26.45 0.95
1998 91 3.53 100.81 0.76 34.03 0.99
1999 62 4.97 13.38 0.86 26.30 0.94
2000 70 4.21 30.18 0.75 17.90 0.96
2001 50 6.40 7.75 1.32 47.96 0.98
2002 57 6.49 10.92 1.21 20.15 0.90
2003 40 9.87 7.61 1.12 20.42 0.93
Note: Transaction values are regressed on reserves of oil (in bbls) and natural gas (in mcf).
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-1b: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9







1982 14 16.54 1.36 7.79 11.44 0.28 1.26 0.99
1983 22 10.91 0.67 4.22 6.33 0.64 6.05 0.91
1984 34 53.79 1.76 3.70 32.83 1.01 23.55 0.99
1985 35 21.18 1.86 5.96 12.85 0.61 4.21 0.99
1986 27 12.79 1.31 1.96 3.01 0.96 20.48 0.97
1987 51 -3.70 -0.87 5.64 26.77 1.00 6.79 0.94
1988 66 -9.20 -2.05 6.17 22.65 1.21 52.64 0.99
1989 104 -8.15 -1.85 5.17 5.75 1.24 22.59 0.87
1990 160 6.82 2.42 4.10 20.94 0.46 13.68 0.82
1991 101 -1.42 -0.82 3.37 11.19 1.16 28.45 0.96
1992 92 -4.29 -1.87 6.41 28.38 0.76 26.21 0.98
1993 122 -9.92 -1.96 3.23 2.73 1.52 18.35 0.82
1994 98 1.76 0.36 5.57 12.99 0.73 7.69 0.77
1995 124 -1.24 -0.51 3.18 23.48 0.89 22.53 0.90
1996 100 -11.88 -3.60 7.41 15.99 1.01 17.21 0.90
1997 72 3.25 0.41 2.87 18.88 1.13 24.04 0.94
1998 91 -2.37 -0.60 3.53 100.39 0.76 32.92 0.99
1999 62 -3.73 -1.46 5.17 13.15 0.89 23.31 0.91
2000 70 19.49 1.21 4.20 30.05 0.73 16.48 0.96
2001 50 -3.45 -0.24 6.48 7.25 1.32 45.39 0.98
2002 57 -11.82 -0.65 6.65 10.25 1.23 18.30 0.87
2003 40 7.75 0.60 9.52 6.63 1.09 14.69 0.86
Note: Transaction values are regressed on reserves of oil (in bbls) and natural gas (in mcf).
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-1c: Comparisons of Oil Regression Values with Pure Oil Values for All Transactions (No 
Constant)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Oil Coefficient     
($/bbl) # Obs
Weighted ppb from 
Pure Oil Transactions 
($/bbl) # Obs
Ratio of Estimated Oil 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppb
1982 7.59 14 7.11 1 1.07
1983 4.35 22 10.15 2 0.43
1984 3.71 34 6.93 8 0.53
1985 5.62 35 3.39 5 1.66
1986 2.12 27 8.86 3 0.24
1987 5.60 51 5.27 12 1.06
1988 6.07 66 6.44 14 0.94
1989 4.60 104 4.72 19 0.97
1990 4.18 160 4.50 38 0.93
1991 3.35 101 4.69 20 0.71
1992 6.34 92 4.75 20 1.34
1993 2.60 122 3.90 28 0.67
1994 5.59 98 7.70 17 0.73
1995 3.16 124 3.36 35 0.94
1996 6.98 100 5.36 31 1.30
1997 2.88 72 3.67 16 0.79
1998 3.53 91 3.40 19 1.04
1999 4.97 62 4.23 13 1.18
2000 4.21 70 4.07 15 1.04
2001 6.40 50 4.43 10 1.44
2002 6.49 57 5.52 14 1.18
2003 9.87 40 6.41 5 1.54
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Note: The pure oil value observations are weighted volumetrically by the barrels in each transaction for a given 
year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the total 
volumes of oil reserves sold.
Table B-1d: Comparisons of Natural Gas Regression Values with Pure Gas Values for All Transactions 
(No Constant)
.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year Gas Coefficient ($/mcf) # Obs





Ratio of Estimated Gas 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppmcf
1982 0.35 14 --- 0 ---
1983 0.65 22 1.05 1 0.62
1984 1.02 34 1.32 1 0.77
1985 0.73 35 1.34 4 0.55
1986 0.97 27 0.92 3 1.06
1987 0.94 51 0.89 5 1.05
1988 1.20 66 1.00 9 1.21
1989 1.21 104 1.18 18 1.03
1990 0.48 160 0.83 29 0.58
1991 1.16 101 0.90 18 1.28
1992 0.75 92 0.66 20 1.14
1993 1.49 122 0.73 28 2.04
1994 0.74 98 0.88 33 0.84
1995 0.88 124 0.75 33 1.18
1996 0.95 100 0.63 31 1.51
1997 1.13 72 0.93 27 1.22
1998 0.76 91 0.69 45 1.09
1999 0.86 62 0.85 26 1.02
2000 0.75 70 0.79 28 0.95
2001 1.32 50 1.31 17 1.01
2002 1.21 57 1.13 36 1.07
2003 1.12 40 1.22 23 0.92
--- Insufficient data points.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Note: The pure gas value observations are weighted volumetrically by the cubic feet in each transaction for a 
given year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the 
total volumes of gas reserves sold.
Table B-2a: Regression Results for All Transactions (No Constant), Excluding Outliers
(with Robust Standard Errors, rather than OLS Standard Errors)





($/mcf) t-stat Adjusted R 2
1982 13 7.13 9.18 0.36 1.26 0.76
1983 21 3.37 39.87 0.64 58.92 0.99
1984 31 6.95 177.40 0.86 173.62 0.90
1985 34 7.74 1.66 0.52 1.05 0.89
1986 25 5.10 6.66 0.96 20.63 0.99
1987 49 4.40 6.48 1.02 6.96 0.92
1988 64 5.69 22.87 0.99 32.97 0.98
1989 99 4.61 3.56 0.88 5.75 0.82
1990 151 3.64 9.07 0.90 15.61 0.94
1991 94 4.44 12.36 0.87 29.63 0.96
1992 86 4.14 6.95 0.82 11.43 0.89
1993 115 3.54 15.00 0.87 13.45 0.94
1994 92 2.90 4.32 0.77 19.58 0.91
1995 114 3.81 16.85 0.60 9.93 0.95
1996 94 3.67 3.98 0.69 17.76 0.86
1997 67 5.01 14.24 0.93 15.52 0.92
1998 83 2.85 3.15 0.62 6.33 0.81
1999 57 3.59 6.31 0.67 7.39 0.88
2000 66 3.55 1.96 0.75 6.17 0.74
2001 46 5.75 5.92 1.45 8.91 0.97
2002 49 5.74 10.20 0.88 9.69 0.95
2003 36 8.17 17.81 1.19 18.52 0.97
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-2b: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included), Excluding Outliers
(with Robust Standard Errors, rather than OLS Standard Errors)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9







1982 13 26.09 1.99 5.71 4.57 0.28 1.32 0.65
1983 21 8.37 2.84 3.28 55.43 0.64 75.33 0.99
1984 31 16.29 2.80 6.88 157.34 0.86 227.36 0.90
1985 34 21.87 2.13 8.22 1.85 0.39 0.77 0.88
1986 25 0.33 0.11 5.09 6.91 0.96 18.74 0.98
1987 49 -2.29 -2.11 4.61 6.05 1.05 6.69 0.90
1988 64 -2.36 -1.22 5.72 23.13 0.99 35.14 0.98
1989 99 -1.13 -0.40 4.69 3.42 0.88 5.40 0.77
1990 151 -0.25 -0.46 3.65 8.84 0.90 14.80 0.92
1991 94 -0.30 -0.76 4.47 11.85 0.87 31.11 0.95
1992 86 -0.70 -0.53 4.17 6.77 0.83 11.36 0.86
1993 115 -0.20 -0.34 3.56 14.60 0.87 12.86 0.92
1994 92 1.49 1.69 2.82 4.12 0.75 18.20 0.87
1995 114 1.17 1.40 3.76 15.86 0.59 9.03 0.93
1996 94 -0.46 -0.33 3.71 3.65 0.69 16.38 0.78
1997 67 -2.70 -0.91 5.08 14.78 0.94 16.34 0.89
1998 83 9.76 2.68 2.54 2.86 0.57 5.65 0.72
1999 57 3.12 1.43 3.24 4.48 0.63 5.58 0.79
2000 66 21.40 2.16 3.17 1.81 0.71 5.85 0.67
2001 46 -11.25 -2.72 5.85 6.27 1.49 9.59 0.97
2002 49 3.82 0.63 5.67 9.18 0.86 8.11 0.92
2003 36 -7.82 -2.14 8.54 22.43 1.23 17.11 0.93
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-2c: Effect of Including Constant on Regression Coeffcients
(Excluding Outliers)
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Oil Coefficient ($/bbl) Gas Coefficient ($/mcf)
Year
Constant 
Included No Constant Ratio
Constant 
Included No Constant Ratio # Obs
1982 5.71 7.13 0.80 0.28 0.36 0.79 13
1983 3.28 3.37 0.97 0.64 0.64 0.99 21
1984 6.88 6.95 0.99 0.86 0.86 1.00 31
1985 8.22 7.74 1.06 0.39 0.52 0.74 34
1986 5.09 5.10 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 25
1987 4.61 4.40 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.03 49
1988 5.72 5.69 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.01 64
1989 4.69 4.61 1.02 0.88 0.88 1.01 99
1990 3.65 3.64 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 151
1991 4.47 4.44 1.01 0.87 0.87 1.01 94
1992 4.17 4.14 1.01 0.83 0.82 1.01 86
1993 3.56 3.54 1.01 0.87 0.87 1.00 115
1994 2.82 2.90 0.97 0.75 0.77 0.98 92
1995 3.76 3.81 0.99 0.59 0.60 0.98 114
1996 3.71 3.67 1.01 0.69 0.69 1.01 94
1997 5.08 5.01 1.01 0.94 0.93 1.01 67
1998 2.54 2.85 0.89 0.57 0.62 0.92 83
1999 3.24 3.59 0.90 0.63 0.67 0.94 57
2000 3.17 3.55 0.89 0.71 0.75 0.95 66
2001 5.85 5.75 1.02 1.49 1.45 1.03 46
2002 5.67 5.74 0.99 0.86 0.88 0.98 49
2003 8.54 8.17 1.04 1.23 1.19 1.04 36
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-2d: Effect of Outliers on Reserve Coefficients
(No Constant)
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7










Ratio         
5/6
1982 7.59 7.13 1.06 0.35 0.36 0.97
1983 4.35 3.37 1.29 0.65 0.64 1.01
1984 3.71 6.95 0.53 1.02 0.86 1.18
1985 5.62 7.74 0.73 0.73 0.52 1.40
1986 2.12 5.10 0.42 0.97 0.96 1.01
1987 5.60 4.40 1.27 0.94 1.02 0.91
1988 6.07 5.69 1.07 1.20 0.99 1.22
1989 4.60 4.61 1.00 1.21 0.88 1.38
1990 4.18 3.64 1.15 0.48 0.90 0.53
1991 3.35 4.44 0.76 1.16 0.87 1.33
1992 6.34 4.14 1.53 0.75 0.82 0.91
1993 2.60 3.54 0.73 1.49 0.87 1.71
1994 5.59 2.90 1.93 0.74 0.77 0.96
1995 3.16 3.81 0.83 0.88 0.60 1.46
1996 6.98 3.67 1.90 0.95 0.69 1.39
1997 2.88 5.01 0.58 1.13 0.93 1.22
1998 3.53 2.85 1.24 0.76 0.62 1.23
1999 4.97 3.59 1.39 0.86 0.67 1.28
2000 4.21 3.55 1.19 0.75 0.75 1.00
2001 6.40 5.75 1.11 1.32 1.45 0.91
2002 6.49 5.74 1.13 1.21 0.88 1.37
2003 9.87 8.17 1.21 1.12 1.19 0.94
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table B-2e: Comparisons of Oil Regression Values (No Constant) with Pure Oil Values, Excluding 
Outliers
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Oil Coefficient     
($/bbl) # Obs
Weighted ppb from 
Pure Oil Transactions 
($/bbl) # Obs
Ratio of Estimated Oil 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppb
1982 7.13 13 7.11 1 1.00
1983 3.37 21 10.15 2 0.33
1984 6.95 31 6.94 7 1.00
1985 7.74 34 3.39 5 2.28
1986 5.10 25 8.86 3 0.58
1987 4.40 49 3.56 10 1.24
1988 5.69 64 6.15 13 0.93
1989 4.61 99 4.72 18 0.98
1990 3.64 151 4.22 35 0.86
1991 4.44 94 4.66 19 0.95
1992 4.14 86 3.46 18 1.20
1993 3.54 115 3.70 27 0.96
1994 2.90 92 3.71 15 0.78
1995 3.81 114 3.63 30 1.05
1996 3.67 94 3.84 30 0.96
1997 5.01 67 4.81 13 1.04
1998 2.85 83 3.34 16 0.85
1999 3.59 57 4.22 12 0.85
2000 3.55 66 3.46 14 1.03
2001 5.75 46 3.88 9 1.48
2002 5.74 49 5.19 11 1.11
2003 8.17 36 6.41 5 1.28
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Note: The pure oil value observations are weighted volumetrically by the barrels in each transaction for a given 
year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the total 
volumes of oil reserves sold.
Table C-1: Proven Reserves to Production Ratios
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7















Ratio         
5/6
1982 29426 2950 10.0 201730 17506 11.5
1983 27858 3020 9.2 201512 15788 12.8
1984 27735 3037 9.1 200247 17193 11.6
1985 28446 3052 9.3 197463 15985 12.4
1986 28416 2973 9.6 193369 15610 12.4
1987 26889 2873 9.4 191586 16114 11.9
1988 27256 2811 9.7 187211 16670 11.2
1989 26825 2586 10.4 168024 16983 9.9
1990 26501 2505 10.6 167116 17233 9.7
1991 26254 2512 10.5 169346 17202 9.8
1992 24682 2446 10.1 167062 17423 9.6
1993 23745 2339 10.2 165015 17789 9.3
1994 22957 2268 10.1 162415 18322 8.9
1995 22457 2213 10.1 163837 17966 9.1
1996 22351 2173 10.3 165146 18861 8.8
1997 22017 2138 10.3 166474 19211 8.7
1998 22546 1991 11.3 167233 18720 8.9
1999 21034 1952 10.8 164041 18928 8.7
2000 21765 1880 11.6 167406 19219 8.7
2001 22045 1915 11.5 177427 19779 9.0
2002 22446 2106 10.7 183460 20351 9.0
2003 22677 1877 12.1 186946 19425 9.6
Note: Beginning reserves indicate remaining reserves at January 1.
Source: EIA/DOE "US Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves"
Table B-2f: Comparisons of Natural Gas Regression Values (No Constant) with Pure Gas Values, 
Excluding Outliers
.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year Gas Coefficient ($/mcf) # Obs





Ratio of Estimated Gas 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppmcf
1982 0.36 13 --- 0 ---
1983 0.64 21 1.05 1 0.61
1984 0.86 31 1.32 1 0.65
1985 0.52 34 1.34 4 0.39
1986 0.96 25 0.92 3 1.05
1987 1.02 49 0.89 5 1.15
1988 0.99 64 1.00 9 0.99
1989 0.88 99 1.18 18 0.74
1990 0.90 151 0.81 27 1.11
1991 0.87 94 0.90 18 0.96
1992 0.82 86 0.56 18 1.47
1993 0.87 115 0.77 26 1.13
1994 0.77 92 0.76 31 1.01
1995 0.60 114 0.70 31 0.87
1996 0.69 94 0.60 29 1.14
1997 0.93 67 0.90 26 1.03
1998 0.62 83 0.69 42 0.89
1999 0.67 57 0.83 24 0.82
2000 0.75 66 0.73 26 1.03
2001 1.45 46 1.07 14 1.36
2002 0.88 49 0.96 32 0.91
2003 1.19 36 1.20 21 0.99
--- Insufficient data points.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Note: The pure gas value observations are weighted volumetrically by the cubic feet in each transaction for a 
given year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the 
total volumes of gas reserves sold.
Table C-2: Regression Results for Transactions with Information on Reserve Status (No Constant), 
Excluding Outliers
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Oil ($/bbl) Natural Gas ($/mcf)




















1982 7.13 4.02 --- --- 0.36 1.54 --- --- 0.72 13 13 13 13
1983 5.84 0.10 -2.47 -0.04 0.64 25.51 --- --- 0.99 21 20 20 21
1984 3.50 4.72 3.47 4.71 2.05 0.47 -0.94 -0.22 0.99 31 31 31 33
1985 -3.28 -0.04 12.46 0.16 1.38 2.51 -1.05 -1.76 0.89 34 32 32 32
1986 6.94 1.07 -1.82 -0.28 1.19 3.85 -0.24 -0.76 0.99 25 24 24 25
1987 4.44 1.06 -0.68 -0.16 0.80 3.83 0.33 1.42 0.92 49 41 41 44
1988 5.50 41.66 2.76 6.28 1.02 46.41 -0.25 -5.45 0.99 64 55 55 56
1989 5.15 2.94 -0.02 -0.01 1.02 16.29 -0.50 -4.62 0.85 99 85 87 89
1990 4.58 1.33 -0.96 -0.28 0.82 14.41 0.10 1.49 0.94 151 142 146 149
1991 4.33 18.84 0.47 1.09 0.79 7.22 0.08 0.70 0.96 94 80 81 89
1992 4.18 10.23 0.08 0.13 0.78 9.34 0.11 0.90 0.89 86 57 63 67
1993 3.57 12.15 -0.57 -0.97 0.81 29.57 0.19 3.91 0.95 115 74 84 81
1994 3.14 12.81 -0.64 -1.38 0.79 24.20 -0.26 -2.38 0.91 92 53 63 55
1995 3.93 28.77 -1.20 -2.63 0.66 22.35 -0.07 -1.76 0.95 114 78 90 85
1996 4.01 14.34 -1.58 -2.53 0.74 16.77 -0.15 -1.83 0.87 94 57 67 63
1997 3.56 4.45 1.86 2.09 0.90 11.46 0.07 0.70 0.93 67 46 53 53
1998 1.81 5.21 3.01 5.00 0.80 13.77 -0.27 -3.85 0.87 83 46 68 54
1999 3.79 8.19 -0.56 -0.30 0.58 13.11 0.25 3.50 0.90 57 26 43 30
2000 6.02 3.10 -3.32 -1.48 0.77 11.06 -0.10 -0.83 0.74 66 29 50 34
2001 5.43 7.72 -0.34 -0.27 1.38 14.71 0.22 1.25 0.97 46 18 31 25
2002 5.55 9.19 0.23 0.34 1.06 9.48 -0.21 -1.77 0.95 49 27 47 36
2003 8.37 11.55 -3.89 -1.38 1.24 29.31 -0.29 -2.69 0.97 36 29 28 11
--- Insufficient data points.
Note: Reserve status - whether reserves are on production or not.
Equation Specification:
where:
adjprice is transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets)
the 'o' superscript denotes oil
the 'g' superscript denotes gas
a1 and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested
R denotes reserves sold
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 Table C-3: Regression Results for Transactions with Information on R/P Ratios (No Constant), Excluding 
Outliers
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Oil ($/bbl) Natural Gas ($/mcf)
Year a1 t-stat a2 t-stat a1 t-stat a2 t-stat
Adjusted
R 2 Obs
1982 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1983 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1984 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1985 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1986 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1987 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1988 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1989 11.00 3.35 -1.64 -2.00 0.80 4.30 0.03 1.17 0.97 17
1990 4.95 2.57 -0.39 -0.61 1.08 24.70 -0.04 -6.22 0.99 14
1991 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1992 3.81 4.40 0.07 0.33 1.05 7.29 -0.08 -2.37 0.93 32
1993 3.85 10.11 -0.06 -1.15 1.21 20.16 -0.09 -7.22 0.97 46
1994 2.31 3.44 0.22 1.43 1.08 7.16 -0.07 -1.97 0.93 42
1995 5.00 7.57 -0.29 -1.66 0.72 8.49 -0.01 -0.77 0.97 42
1996 4.55 11.16 -0.01 -2.95 0.86 5.72 -0.02 -0.91 0.89 41
1997 5.00 5.35 -0.29 -1.73 0.93 25.56 0.00 -0.28 0.98 24
1998 5.68 8.14 -0.29 -5.62 1.06 13.96 -0.04 -2.97 0.95 42
1999 4.71 2.30 -0.16 -0.46 0.58 3.20 0.00 -0.03 0.86 32
2000 11.53 3.15 -0.66 -1.44 0.95 10.68 -0.03 -2.92 0.88 37
2001 5.19 3.05 -0.07 -0.22 2.20 11.66 -0.16 -5.21 0.96 28
2002 10.33 7.96 -0.99 -3.75 1.45 8.31 -0.08 -2.44 0.97 27
2003 9.44 4.12 -0.51 -0.54 1.23 26.97 0.00 0.21 0.97 29
--- Insufficient data points.
R/P ratio is the ratio of remaining reserves to annual production.
Equation Specification:
where:
adjprice is transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets)
the 'o' superscript denotes oil
the 'g' superscript denotes gas
a1 and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested
R denotes reserves sold
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Table C-4: Oil and Natural Gas Reserve and Field Prices
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Oil ($/bbl) Natural Gas ($/mcf)
Year Field Price Reserve Price
Ratio        
3/2
 
Field Price Reserve Price
Ratio         
6/5
1982 28.52 7.13 0.250 2.46 0.36 0.145
1983 26.19 3.37 0.129 2.59 0.64 0.248
1984 25.88 6.95 0.268 2.66 0.86 0.325
1985 24.09 7.74 0.321 2.51 0.52 0.208
1986 12.51 5.10 0.408 1.94 0.96 0.497
1987 15.40 4.40 0.286 1.67 1.02 0.613
1988 12.58 5.69 0.452 1.69 0.99 0.583
1989 15.86 4.61 0.291 1.69 0.88 0.519
1990 20.03 3.64 0.182 1.71 0.90 0.526
1991 16.54 4.44 0.268 1.64 0.87 0.530
1992 15.99 4.14 0.259 1.74 0.82 0.473
1993 14.25 3.54 0.248 2.04 0.87 0.428
1994 13.19 2.90 0.220 1.85 0.77 0.415
1995 14.62 3.81 0.261 1.55 0.60 0.390
1996 18.46 3.67 0.199 2.17 0.69 0.317
1997 17.23 5.01 0.291 2.32 0.93 0.401
1998 10.87 2.85 0.262 1.96 0.62 0.315
1999 15.56 3.59 0.231 2.19 0.67 0.308
2000 26.72 3.55 0.133 3.69 0.75 0.203
2001 21.84 5.75 0.263 4.12 1.45 0.352
2002 22.51 5.74 0.255 2.95 0.88 0.298
2003 27.56 8.17 0.296 4.98 1.19 0.239
Sources:
Cols 2, 5 EIA/DOE "Monthly Energy Review" November 2004
Cols 3, 6 Table B2-a
Table C-5: Regression Results: Reserve Prices and Field Prices
Reserve Prices Against Field Prices
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Constant t-stat Coeff t-stat Adj. R 2 Obs
Oil Contemporary Price ($/bbl) 1.75 1.73 0.16 3.13 0.30 22
Gas Contempory Price ($/mcf) 0.57 4.26 0.11 2.03 0.13 22
Oil 1 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 1.74 1.69 0.16 2.98 0.28 21
Gas 1 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.59 3.80 0.12 1.80 0.10 21
Oil 2 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 1.78 1.73 0.16 3.01 0.30 20
Gas 2 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.69 4.22 0.08 1.09 0.01 20
Reserve Prices Against First Differences in Field Prices
Oil Contemporary Price ($/bbl) 4.69 13.93 -0.02 -0.29 -0.05 21
Gas Contempory Price ($/mcf) 0.84 18.12 0.08 1.16 0.02 21
Oil 1 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 4.77 13.76 0.03 0.46 -0.04 20
Gas 1 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.86 18.21 0.09 0.99 0.00 20
Oil 2 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 4.64 13.42 -0.02 -0.31 -0.05 19
Gas 2 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.86 16.56 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 19
Table D-1: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Oil
.



































1982 0.10 0.09 7.13 0.78 9.98 28.52 0.12 18.54 2.60 14.7
1983 0.11 0.10 3.37 0.08 9.17 26.19 -0.17 17.02 5.05 161.4
1984 0.11 0.10 6.95 0.04 9.06 25.88 0.11 16.82 2.42 252.1
1985 0.11 0.10 7.74 4.66 8.43 24.09 0.11 15.66 2.02 1.7
1986 0.10 0.09 5.10 0.77 4.38 12.51 0.10 8.13 1.59 4.0
1987 0.11 0.10 4.40 0.68 5.39 15.40 0.05 10.01 2.27 8.3
1988 0.10 0.09 5.69 0.25 4.40 12.58 0.14 8.18 1.44 10.0
1989 0.10 0.09 4.61 1.30 5.55 15.86 0.06 10.31 2.23 4.4
1990 0.09 0.09 3.64 0.40 7.01 20.03 -0.05 13.02 3.58 23.4
1991 0.10 0.09 4.44 0.36 5.79 16.54 0.03 10.75 2.42 17.6
1992 0.10 0.09 4.14 0.60 5.60 15.99 0.01 10.39 2.51 10.5
1993 0.10 0.09 3.54 0.24 4.99 14.25 -0.03 9.26 2.62 24.3
1994 0.10 0.09 2.90 0.67 4.62 13.19 -0.03 8.57 2.96 8.5
1995 0.10 0.09 3.81 0.23 5.12 14.62 0.00 9.50 2.49 25.2
1996 0.10 0.09 3.67 0.92 6.46 18.46 -0.07 12.00 3.27 9.0
1997 0.10 0.09 5.01 0.35 6.03 17.23 0.02 11.20 2.24 17.6
1998 0.09 0.08 2.85 0.90 3.80 10.87 -0.01 7.07 2.48 4.7
1999 0.09 0.08 3.59 0.57 5.45 15.56 -0.04 10.11 2.82 11.5
2000 0.09 0.08 3.55 1.81 9.35 26.72 -0.19 17.37 4.89 7.6
2001 0.09 0.08 5.75 0.97 7.64 21.84 -0.02 14.20 2.47 8.7
2002 0.09 0.09 5.74 0.56 7.88 22.51 -0.04 14.63 2.55 15.8
2003 0.08 0.08 8.17 0.46 9.65 27.56 0.00 17.91 2.19 21.2
Note: A value of 0.00 implies negligible growth rates.
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2a, Col 3.
(5) Regression Results.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-4.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-2: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Pure Oil
.



































1982 0.10 0.09 7.11 --- 9.98 28.52 0.12 18.54 2.61 ---
1983 0.11 0.10 10.15 3.38 9.17 26.19 0.16 17.02 1.68 2.0
1984 0.11 0.10 6.94 0.47 9.06 25.88 0.11 16.82 2.43 21.0
1985 0.11 0.10 3.39 2.24 8.43 24.09 -0.13 15.66 4.62 5.5
1986 0.10 0.09 8.86 1.95 4.38 12.51 0.16 8.13 0.92 -0.4
1987 0.11 0.10 3.56 2.03 5.39 15.40 -0.01 10.01 2.81 3.2
1988 0.10 0.09 6.15 1.62 4.40 12.58 0.15 8.18 1.33 1.3
1989 0.10 0.09 4.72 1.50 5.55 15.86 0.07 10.31 2.19 3.7
1990 0.09 0.09 4.22 1.71 7.01 20.03 -0.01 13.02 3.08 5.2
1991 0.10 0.09 4.66 1.89 5.79 16.54 0.04 10.75 2.31 3.2
1992 0.10 0.09 3.46 1.59 5.60 15.99 -0.04 10.39 3.01 4.4
1993 0.10 0.09 3.70 2.01 4.99 14.25 -0.02 9.26 2.50 2.8
1994 0.10 0.09 3.71 2.93 4.62 13.19 0.02 8.57 2.31 1.7
1995 0.10 0.09 3.63 1.45 5.12 14.62 -0.01 9.50 2.62 4.1
1996 0.10 0.09 3.84 2.09 6.46 18.46 -0.06 12.00 3.12 3.9
1997 0.10 0.09 4.81 2.60 6.03 17.23 0.01 11.20 2.33 2.5
1998 0.09 0.08 3.34 1.87 3.80 10.87 0.02 7.07 2.11 2.0
1999 0.09 0.08 4.22 1.71 5.45 15.56 0.00 10.11 2.40 3.4
2000 0.09 0.08 3.46 2.26 9.35 26.72 -0.20 17.37 5.02 6.1
2001 0.09 0.08 3.88 0.31 7.64 21.84 -0.11 14.20 3.66 33.8
2002 0.09 0.09 5.19 2.08 7.88 22.51 -0.06 14.63 2.82 4.5
2003 0.08 0.08 6.41 1.55 9.65 27.56 -0.04 17.91 2.79 7.4
--- Insufficient data points.
Note: A value of 0.00 implies negligible growth rates.
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2e, Col 4.
(5) Statistical Results.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-4.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-3: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Natural Gas
.



































1982 0.09 0.08 0.36 0.28 0.86 2.46 -0.02 1.60 4.48 4.4
1983 0.08 0.07 0.64 0.01 0.91 2.59 0.10 1.68 2.62 95.5
1984 0.09 0.08 0.86 0.00 0.93 2.66 0.17 1.73 2.00 173.7
1985 0.08 0.07 0.52 0.50 0.88 2.51 0.05 1.63 3.12 2.2
1986 0.08 0.07 0.96 0.05 0.68 1.94 0.13 1.26 1.31 6.3
1987 0.08 0.08 1.02 0.15 0.58 1.67 0.16 1.09 1.06 0.4
1988 0.09 0.08 0.99 0.03 0.59 1.69 0.17 1.10 1.11 3.8
1989 0.10 0.09 0.88 0.15 0.59 1.69 0.15 1.10 1.25 1.5
1990 0.10 0.09 0.90 0.06 0.60 1.71 0.15 1.11 1.24 3.7
1991 0.10 0.09 0.87 0.03 0.57 1.64 0.14 1.07 1.23 6.7
1992 0.10 0.09 0.82 0.07 0.61 1.74 0.11 1.13 1.37 4.3
1993 0.11 0.10 0.87 0.06 0.71 2.04 0.07 1.33 1.52 7.0
1994 0.11 0.10 0.77 0.04 0.65 1.85 0.08 1.20 1.57 11.1
1995 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.06 0.54 1.55 0.07 1.01 1.67 6.6
1996 0.11 0.10 0.69 0.04 0.76 2.17 0.02 1.41 2.05 18.7
1997 0.12 0.10 0.93 0.06 0.81 2.32 0.06 1.51 1.62 9.6
1998 0.11 0.10 0.62 0.10 0.69 1.96 0.00 1.27 2.06 6.7
1999 0.12 0.10 0.67 0.09 0.77 2.19 0.00 1.42 2.11 8.2
2000 0.11 0.10 0.75 0.12 1.29 3.69 -0.10 2.40 3.21 13.6
2001 0.11 0.10 1.45 0.16 1.44 4.12 0.02 2.68 1.84 7.5
2002 0.11 0.10 0.88 0.09 1.03 2.95 -0.02 1.92 2.18 11.5
2003 0.10 0.09 1.19 0.06 1.74 4.98 -0.07 3.24 2.72 31.9
Note: A value of 0.00 implies negligible growth rates.
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2a, Col 5.
(5) Regression Results.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-4.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-4: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Pure Natural Gas
.


































1982 0.09 0.08 --- --- 0.86 2.46 --- 1.60 --- ---
1983 0.08 0.07 1.05 --- 0.91 2.59 0.18 1.68 1.61 ---
1984 0.09 0.08 1.32 --- 0.93 2.66 0.23 1.73 1.31 ---
1985 0.08 0.07 1.34 11.01 0.88 2.51 0.20 1.63 1.22 0.0
1986 0.08 0.07 0.92 0.18 0.68 1.94 0.13 1.26 1.37 1.9
1987 0.08 0.08 0.89 0.34 0.58 1.67 0.15 1.09 1.22 0.6
1988 0.09 0.08 1.00 0.27 0.59 1.69 0.17 1.10 1.10 0.4
1989 0.10 0.09 1.18 0.59 0.59 1.69 0.18 1.10 0.93 -0.1
1990 0.10 0.09 0.81 0.29 0.60 1.71 0.14 1.11 1.37 1.0
1991 0.10 0.09 0.90 0.35 0.57 1.64 0.14 1.07 1.18 0.5
1992 0.10 0.09 0.56 0.21 0.61 1.74 0.04 1.13 2.02 2.7
1993 0.11 0.10 0.77 0.28 0.71 2.04 0.05 1.33 1.71 2.0
1994 0.11 0.10 0.76 0.34 0.65 1.85 0.08 1.20 1.58 1.3
1995 0.11 0.10 0.70 0.24 0.54 1.55 0.09 1.01 1.45 1.3
1996 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.17 0.76 2.17 -0.01 1.41 2.35 4.6
1997 0.12 0.10 0.90 0.33 0.81 2.32 0.06 1.51 1.68 1.8
1998 0.11 0.10 0.69 0.29 0.69 1.96 0.02 1.27 1.85 2.0
1999 0.12 0.10 0.83 0.60 0.77 2.19 0.04 1.42 1.72 1.0
2000 0.11 0.10 0.73 0.48 1.29 3.69 -0.11 2.40 3.29 3.5
2001 0.11 0.10 1.07 0.09 1.44 4.12 -0.05 2.68 2.51 17.8
2002 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.51 1.03 2.95 -0.01 1.92 1.99 1.9
2003 0.10 0.09 1.20 0.28 1.74 4.98 -0.07 3.24 2.70 7.3
--- Insufficient data points.
Note: A value of 0.00 implies negligible growth rates.
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2f, Col 4.
(5) Statistical Results.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-4.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-5: Confidence Limits for Implicit Growth Rate of Oil Prices
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variance of V Method Delta Method
Year
Implicit Annual 
Growth Rate in 
Price (g) Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1982 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.17
1983 -0.17 -0.20 -0.15 -0.19 -0.14
1984 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
1985 0.11 -2.42 0.22 -0.12 0.35
1986 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.14
1987 0.05 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 0.11
1988 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15
1989 0.06 -0.19 0.13 -0.05 0.17
1990 -0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.12 0.02
1991 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07
1992 0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.07
1993 -0.03 -1.29 0.00 -0.06 0.00
1994 -0.03 -0.26 0.05 -0.15 0.09
1995 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.03
1996 -0.07 -0.36 0.03 -0.21 0.07
1997 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05
1998 -0.01 -0.36 0.06 -0.14 0.11
1999 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.12 0.04
2000 -0.19 -2.29 0.01 -0.58 0.21
2001 -0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.08 0.05
2002 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.00
2003 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Note: A value of 0.00 implies negligible growth rates.
Sources:





The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table D-6: Confidence Limits for Implicit Growth Rate of Natural Gas Prices
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variance of V Method Delta Method
Year
Implicit Annual 
Growth Rate in 
Price (g) Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1982 -0.02 -0.93 0.20 -0.58 0.55
1983 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
1984 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
1985 0.05 -0.93 0.21 -0.39 0.50
1986 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14
1987 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.19
1988 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17
1989 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.19
1990 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16
1991 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14
1992 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.13
1993 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.09
1994 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10
1995 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10
1996 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05
1997 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09
1998 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.06
1999 0.00 -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.06
2000 -0.10 -0.26 -0.02 -0.21 0.00
2001 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.06
2002 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.02
2003 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04
Note: A value of 0.00 implies negligible growth rates.
Sources:





The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2004
Table D-7: Return to Holding Oil and Natural Gas, 1982-2003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year
Riskless 
Rate      
(1-yr TB)



















1983 0.096 3.37 -0.527 -0.623 0.64 0.800 0.704 0.111
1984 0.109 6.95 1.061 0.952 0.86 0.345 0.236 0.125
1985 0.084 7.74 0.114 0.030 0.52 -0.395 -0.479 0.106
1986 0.065 5.10 -0.341 -0.406 0.96 0.843 0.779 0.077
1987 0.068 4.40 -0.136 -0.204 1.02 0.062 -0.005 0.084
1988 0.077 5.69 0.292 0.215 0.99 -0.038 -0.114 0.089
1989 0.085 4.61 -0.189 -0.274 0.88 -0.111 -0.196 0.085
1990 0.079 3.64 -0.211 -0.290 0.90 0.026 -0.053 0.086
1991 0.059 4.44 0.219 0.160 0.87 -0.033 -0.092 0.079
1992 0.039 4.14 -0.067 -0.106 0.82 -0.054 -0.093 0.070
1993 0.034 3.54 -0.145 -0.179 0.87 0.060 0.026 0.059
1994 0.053 2.90 -0.180 -0.234 0.77 -0.121 -0.174 0.071
1995 0.059 3.81 0.315 0.255 0.60 -0.213 -0.272 0.066
1996 0.055 3.67 -0.036 -0.091 0.69 0.138 0.082 0.064
1997 0.056 5.01 0.362 0.306 0.93 0.356 0.300 0.064
1998 0.051 2.85 -0.431 -0.482 0.62 -0.337 -0.388 0.053
1999 0.051 3.59 0.260 0.209 0.67 0.092 0.041 0.057
2000 0.061 3.55 -0.010 -0.071 0.75 0.110 0.049 0.060
2001 0.035 5.75 0.618 0.584 1.45 0.940 0.905 0.050
2002 0.020 5.74 -0.001 -0.021 0.88 -0.395 -0.415 0.046
2003 0.012 8.17 0.424 0.412 1.19 0.354 0.342 0.040
Mean 0.059 0.048 -0.014 0.104 0.042 0.073
St.Dev. 0.022 0.373 0.371 0.385 0.382 0.021
St.Err. 0.005 0.083 0.083 0.086 0.085 0.005
Mn/Se 12.099 0.578 -0.163 1.206 0.493 15.622
Sources:
(2) Federal Reserve Board Historical Rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm1y.txt)
(3) Oil Reserve Price, Table B-2a, Col 3.
(4) Percentage Change, Col 3 (t)/Col 3 (t-1) - 1
(5) Oil Achieved Risk Premium, Col 4 - Col 2
(6) Natural Gas Reserve Price, Table B-2a, Col 5.
(7) Percentage Change, Col 8 (t)/Col 8 (t-1) - 1
(8) Natural Gas Achieved Risk Premium, Col 8 - Col 2
(9) Required Risk Premium, LTBR (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm10y.txt)
Table D-8: Levelized Oil Wellhead Prices





P/R     
Ratio















1982 13.01 0.10 9.97 7.13 0.09 0.26 9.98 34.92
1983 11.10 0.11 9.22 3.37 0.10 0.22 9.17 19.08
1984 12.46 0.11 9.13 6.95 0.10 0.25 9.06 31.06
1985 10.62 0.11 9.32 7.74 0.10 0.21 8.43 30.66
1986 7.67 0.10 9.56 5.10 0.09 0.15 4.38 16.42
1987 8.39 0.11 9.36 4.40 0.10 0.17 5.39 16.24
1988 8.85 0.10 9.70 5.69 0.09 0.18 4.40 19.27
1989 8.49 0.10 10.37 4.61 0.09 0.17 5.55 17.85
1990 8.55 0.09 10.58 3.64 0.09 0.17 7.01 16.89
1991 7.86 0.10 10.45 4.44 0.09 0.16 5.79 17.09
1992 7.01 0.10 10.09 4.14 0.09 0.14 5.60 15.18
1993 5.87 0.10 10.15 3.54 0.09 0.12 4.99 12.39
1994 7.09 0.10 10.12 2.90 0.09 0.14 4.62 11.39
1995 6.57 0.10 10.15 3.81 0.09 0.13 5.12 13.64
1996 6.44 0.10 10.29 3.67 0.09 0.13 6.46 14.65
1997 6.35 0.10 10.30 5.01 0.09 0.13 6.03 17.10
1998 5.26 0.09 11.32 2.85 0.08 0.11 3.80 9.79
1999 5.65 0.09 10.78 3.59 0.08 0.11 5.45 13.07
2000 6.03 0.09 11.58 3.55 0.08 0.12 9.35 17.55
2001 5.02 0.09 11.51 5.75 0.08 0.10 7.64 19.53
2002 4.61 0.09 10.66 5.74 0.09 0.09 7.88 18.72
2003 4.01 0.08 12.08 8.17 0.08 0.08 9.65 25.06
Sources:
(2) Required Risk Premium, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm10y.txt.
(3) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table D-1, Col 2.
(4) Reserves/Initial Output Ratio, [ Column (3) ] ^-1.
(5) Reserve Price (b), Table D-1, Col 4.
(6) Adjusted Ratio (a), Table D-1, Col 3.
(7) Discount Rate, 0.02*Column (2).
(8) Operating Cost (c), Table D-1, Col 6.
(9) Levelized Wellhead Price, {Col (4) * Col (5) * [ Col (6) + Col (7) ]} + Col (8).





P/R     
Ratio















1982 13.01 0.09 11.52 0.36 0.08 0.26 0.86 2.26
1983 11.10 0.08 12.76 0.64 0.07 0.22 0.91 3.32
1984 12.46 0.09 11.65 0.86 0.08 0.25 0.93 4.23
1985 10.62 0.08 12.35 0.52 0.07 0.21 0.88 2.73
1986 7.67 0.08 12.39 0.96 0.07 0.15 0.68 3.40
1987 8.39 0.08 11.89 1.02 0.08 0.17 0.58 3.57
1988 8.85 0.09 11.23 0.99 0.08 0.18 0.59 3.45
1989 8.49 0.10 9.89 0.88 0.09 0.17 0.59 2.85
1990 8.55 0.10 9.70 0.90 0.09 0.17 0.60 2.90
1991 7.86 0.10 9.84 0.87 0.09 0.16 0.57 2.70
1992 7.01 0.10 9.59 0.82 0.09 0.14 0.61 2.45
1993 5.87 0.11 9.28 0.87 0.10 0.12 0.71 2.44
1994 7.09 0.11 8.86 0.77 0.10 0.14 0.65 2.29
1995 6.57 0.11 9.12 0.60 0.10 0.13 0.54 1.80
1996 6.44 0.11 8.76 0.69 0.10 0.13 0.76 2.14
1997 6.35 0.12 8.67 0.93 0.10 0.13 0.81 2.66
1998 5.26 0.11 8.93 0.62 0.10 0.11 0.69 1.81
1999 5.65 0.12 8.67 0.67 0.10 0.11 0.77 2.02
2000 6.03 0.11 8.71 0.75 0.10 0.12 1.29 2.74
2001 5.02 0.11 8.97 1.45 0.10 0.10 1.44 4.04
2002 4.61 0.11 9.01 0.88 0.10 0.09 1.03 2.54
2003 4.01 0.10 9.62 1.19 0.09 0.08 1.74 3.73
Sources:
(2) Required Risk Premium, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm10y.txt.
(3)
(4) Reserves/Initial Output Ratio, [ Column (3) ] ^-1.
(5)
(6)
(7) Discount Rate, 0.02*Column (2).
(8)
(9) Levelized Wellhead Price, {Col (4) * Col (5) * [ Col (6) + Col (7) ]} + Col (8).
Operating Cost (c), Table D-3, Col 6.
Table D-9: Levelized Gas Wellhead Prices
Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table D-3, Col 2.
Reserve Price (b), Table D-3, Col 4.
Adjusted Ratio (a), Table D-3, Col 3.
Table D-10:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Oil ($/bbl) Gas ($/mcf)
Year
Levelized 
Price Field Price Ratio
Levelized 
Price Field Price Ratio
1982 34.92 28.52 1.22 2.26 2.46 0.92
1983 19.08 26.19 0.73 3.32 2.59 1.28
1984 31.06 25.88 1.20 4.23 2.66 1.59
1985 30.66 24.09 1.27 2.73 2.51 1.09
1986 16.42 12.51 1.31 3.40 1.94 1.75
1987 16.24 15.40 1.05 3.57 1.67 2.14
1988 19.27 12.58 1.53 3.45 1.69 2.04
1989 17.85 15.86 1.13 2.85 1.69 1.69
1990 16.89 20.03 0.84 2.90 1.71 1.69
1991 17.09 16.54 1.03 2.70 1.64 1.65
1992 15.18 15.99 0.95 2.45 1.74 1.41
1993 12.39 14.25 0.87 2.44 2.04 1.20
1994 11.39 13.19 0.86 2.29 1.85 1.24
1995 13.64 14.62 0.93 1.80 1.55 1.16
1996 14.65 18.46 0.79 2.14 2.17 0.99
1997 17.10 17.23 0.99 2.66 2.32 1.15
1998 9.79 10.87 0.90 1.81 1.96 0.93
1999 13.07 15.56 0.84 2.02 2.19 0.92
2000 17.55 26.72 0.66 2.74 3.69 0.74
2001 19.53 21.84 0.89 4.04 4.12 0.98
2002 18.72 22.51 0.83 2.54 2.95 0.86
2003 25.06 27.56 0.91 3.73 4.98 0.75
Sources:
(2) Levelized Oil Price, Table D-8, Col 9.
(3) Oil Field Price, Table C-4, Col 2.
(4) Ratio, Col 2 / Col 3
(5) Levelized Gas Price, Table D-9, Col 9.
(6) Gas Field Price, Table C-4, Col 5.
(7) Ratio, Col 5 / Col 6



























Oil Levelized Wellhead Price Oil Field Price
Figure 6: Levelized Wellhead Natural Gas Prices derived from Reserve Values,




































































Levelized Wellhead Natural Gas Price Natural Gas Field Price
Table D-1a: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Oil
.



































1982 0.10 0.09 5.58 0.78 9.98 28.52 0.05 18.54 3.32 16.67
1983 0.11 0.10 3.20 0.08 9.17 26.19 -0.20 17.02 5.32 163.45
1984 0.11 0.10 6.87 0.04 9.06 25.88 0.11 16.82 2.45 254.14
1985 0.11 0.10 0.55 4.66 8.43 24.09 -2.42 15.66 28.47 3.24
1986 0.10 0.09 3.57 0.77 4.38 12.51 0.03 8.13 2.28 5.96
1987 0.11 0.10 3.04 0.68 5.39 15.40 -0.05 10.01 3.29 10.25
1988 0.10 0.09 5.19 0.25 4.40 12.58 0.12 8.18 1.58 12.01
1989 0.10 0.09 2.02 1.30 5.55 15.86 -0.19 10.31 5.10 6.39
1990 0.09 0.09 2.84 0.40 7.01 20.03 -0.14 13.02 4.59 25.37
1991 0.10 0.09 3.72 0.36 5.79 16.54 -0.01 10.75 2.89 19.59
1992 0.10 0.09 2.95 0.60 5.60 15.99 -0.09 10.39 3.53 12.50
1993 0.10 0.09 0.55 0.24 4.99 14.25 -1.29 9.26 16.84 36.93
1994 0.10 0.09 1.56 0.67 4.62 13.19 -0.26 8.57 5.51 10.45
1995 0.10 0.09 3.36 0.23 5.12 14.62 -0.03 9.50 2.83 27.15
1996 0.10 0.09 1.83 0.92 6.46 18.46 -0.36 12.00 6.56 11.02
1997 0.10 0.09 4.30 0.35 6.03 17.23 -0.01 11.20 2.60 19.62
1998 0.09 0.08 1.04 0.90 3.80 10.87 -0.36 7.07 6.80 6.67
1999 0.09 0.08 2.45 0.57 5.45 15.56 -0.15 10.11 4.13 13.48
2000 0.09 0.08 0.55 1.81 9.35 26.72 -2.29 17.37 31.58 9.28
2001 0.09 0.08 3.81 0.97 7.64 21.84 -0.12 14.20 3.73 10.70
2002 0.09 0.09 4.61 0.56 7.88 22.51 -0.09 14.63 3.17 17.80
2003 0.08 0.08 7.26 0.46 9.65 27.56 -0.02 17.91 2.47 23.23
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1e.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2b.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-1a.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-1a: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Oil
.



































1982 0.10 0.09 8.69 0.78 9.98 28.52 0.16 18.54 2.13 12.67
1983 0.11 0.10 3.54 0.08 9.17 26.19 -0.15 17.02 4.81 159.45
1984 0.11 0.10 7.03 0.04 9.06 25.88 0.11 16.82 2.39 250.14
1985 0.11 0.10 17.06 4.66 8.43 24.09 0.22 15.66 0.92 -0.30
1986 0.10 0.09 6.63 0.77 4.38 12.51 0.13 8.13 1.23 1.96
1987 0.11 0.10 5.76 0.68 5.39 15.40 0.10 10.01 1.74 6.25
1988 0.10 0.09 6.19 0.25 4.40 12.58 0.15 8.18 1.32 8.01
1989 0.10 0.09 7.21 1.30 5.55 15.86 0.13 10.31 1.43 2.39
1990 0.09 0.09 4.44 0.40 7.01 20.03 0.01 13.02 2.93 21.37
1991 0.10 0.09 5.15 0.36 5.79 16.54 0.06 10.75 2.09 15.59
1992 0.10 0.09 5.33 0.60 5.60 15.99 0.06 10.39 1.95 8.50
1993 0.10 0.09 4.01 0.24 4.99 14.25 0.00 9.26 2.31 22.27
1994 0.10 0.09 4.24 0.67 4.62 13.19 0.05 8.57 2.02 6.45
1995 0.10 0.09 4.26 0.23 5.12 14.62 0.02 9.50 2.23 23.15
1996 0.10 0.09 5.52 0.92 6.46 18.46 0.03 12.00 2.17 7.02
1997 0.10 0.09 5.71 0.35 6.03 17.23 0.04 11.20 1.96 15.62
1998 0.09 0.08 4.66 0.90 3.80 10.87 0.06 7.07 1.52 2.67
1999 0.09 0.08 4.72 0.57 5.45 15.56 0.02 10.11 2.14 9.48
2000 0.09 0.08 7.17 1.81 9.35 26.72 0.01 17.37 2.42 5.63
2001 0.09 0.08 7.69 0.97 7.64 21.84 0.03 14.20 1.85 6.70
2002 0.09 0.09 6.87 0.56 7.88 22.51 0.00 14.63 2.13 13.80
2003 0.08 0.08 9.09 0.46 9.65 27.56 0.02 17.91 1.97 19.23
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1e.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2b.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-1a.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-1c: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Gas
.


































1982 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.28 0.86 2.46 -0.93 1.60 15.99 5.29
1983 0.08 0.07 0.62 0.01 0.91 2.59 0.10 1.68 2.71 97.49
1984 0.09 0.08 0.85 0.00 0.93 2.66 0.17 1.73 2.02 175.68
1985 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.50 0.88 2.51 -0.93 1.63 16.32 3.07
1986 0.08 0.07 0.87 0.05 0.68 1.94 0.12 1.26 1.45 8.34
1987 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.15 0.58 1.67 0.13 1.09 1.49 2.41
1988 0.09 0.08 0.93 0.03 0.59 1.69 0.16 1.10 1.19 5.77
1989 0.10 0.09 0.57 0.15 0.59 1.69 0.09 1.10 1.92 3.46
1990 0.10 0.09 0.78 0.06 0.60 1.71 0.13 1.11 1.42 5.68
1991 0.10 0.09 0.81 0.03 0.57 1.64 0.13 1.07 1.31 8.70
1992 0.10 0.09 0.68 0.07 0.61 1.74 0.08 1.13 1.67 6.29
1993 0.11 0.10 0.74 0.06 0.71 2.04 0.04 1.33 1.79 9.00
1994 0.11 0.10 0.69 0.04 0.65 1.85 0.07 1.20 1.75 13.12
1995 0.11 0.10 0.48 0.06 0.54 1.55 0.03 1.01 2.09 8.64
1996 0.11 0.10 0.61 0.04 0.76 2.17 0.00 1.41 2.31 20.71
1997 0.12 0.10 0.81 0.06 0.81 2.32 0.04 1.51 1.86 11.61
1998 0.11 0.10 0.42 0.10 0.69 1.96 -0.10 1.27 3.02 8.74
1999 0.12 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.77 2.19 -0.08 1.42 2.90 10.22
2000 0.11 0.10 0.51 0.12 1.29 3.69 -0.26 2.40 4.74 15.61
2001 0.11 0.10 1.13 0.16 1.44 4.12 -0.04 2.68 2.38 9.53
2002 0.11 0.10 0.70 0.09 1.03 2.95 -0.08 1.92 2.75 13.46
2003 0.10 0.09 1.06 0.06 1.74 4.98 -0.10 3.24 3.05 33.87
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1e.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2b.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-1a.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Table D-1c: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Gas
.


































1982 0.09 0.08 0.92 0.28 0.86 2.46 0.20 1.60 1.73 2.39
1983 0.08 0.07 0.66 0.01 0.91 2.59 0.11 1.68 2.53 93.49
1984 0.09 0.08 0.87 0.00 0.93 2.66 0.17 1.73 1.98 171.68
1985 0.08 0.07 1.52 0.50 0.88 2.51 0.21 1.63 1.07 0.22
1986 0.08 0.07 1.06 0.05 0.68 1.94 0.14 1.26 1.19 4.34
1987 0.08 0.08 1.32 0.15 0.58 1.67 0.18 1.09 0.82 -1.59
1988 0.09 0.08 1.05 0.03 0.59 1.69 0.17 1.10 1.05 1.77
1989 0.10 0.09 1.18 0.15 0.59 1.69 0.18 1.10 0.93 -0.54
1990 0.10 0.09 1.01 0.06 0.60 1.71 0.16 1.11 1.10 1.68
1991 0.10 0.09 0.93 0.03 0.57 1.64 0.14 1.07 1.15 4.70
1992 0.10 0.09 0.97 0.07 0.61 1.74 0.12 1.13 1.17 2.29
1993 0.11 0.10 1.00 0.06 0.71 2.04 0.09 1.33 1.32 5.00
1994 0.11 0.10 0.85 0.04 0.65 1.85 0.10 1.20 1.42 9.12
1995 0.11 0.10 0.73 0.06 0.54 1.55 0.09 1.01 1.39 4.64
1996 0.11 0.10 0.76 0.04 0.76 2.17 0.04 1.41 1.85 16.71
1997 0.12 0.10 1.05 0.06 0.81 2.32 0.08 1.51 1.43 7.61
1998 0.11 0.10 0.81 0.10 0.69 1.96 0.05 1.27 1.57 4.74
1999 0.12 0.10 0.86 0.09 0.77 2.19 0.05 1.42 1.66 6.22
2000 0.11 0.10 0.99 0.12 1.29 3.69 -0.02 2.40 2.42 11.61
2001 0.11 0.10 1.78 0.16 1.44 4.12 0.05 2.68 1.51 5.53
2002 0.11 0.10 1.06 0.09 1.03 2.95 0.01 1.92 1.81 9.46
2003 0.10 0.09 1.32 0.06 1.74 4.98 -0.04 3.24 2.46 29.87
Sources:
(2) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1e.
(3) Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
(4) Reserve Price (b), Table B-2b.
(6) Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
(7) Field Price (p), Table C-1a.
(8) Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
(9) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
(10) HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
(11) HV Spread, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).























Oil Reserve Price ($/bbl) - All Transactions Oil Reserve Price ($/bbl) - Without Outliers

























Natural Gas Reserve Price ($/mcf) - All Transactions Natural Gas Reserve Price ($/mcf) - Without Outliers

















Levelized Oil Price Levelized Gas Price




























Oil Hotelling Values ($/bbl) Oil Reserve Price ($/bbl)

























Natural Gas Hotelling Values ($/mcf) Natural Gas Reserve Price ($/mcf)


















Oil Implicit Growth Rates Oil Implicit Growth Rate (Lower Variance of V Estimate)
Oil Implicit Growth Rate (Upper Variance of V Estimate) Oil Implicit Growth Rate (Lower Delta Estimate)
Oil Implicit Growth Rate (Upper Delta Estimate)




















Gas Implicit Growth Rates Gas Implicit Growth Rate (Lower Variance of V Estimate)
Gas Implicit Growth Rate (Upper Variance of V Estimate) Gas Implicit Growth Rate (Lower Delta Estimate)
Gas Implicit Growth Rate (Upper Delta Estimate)






















Pure Oil Implicit Growth Rate Pure Natural Gas Implicit Growth Rate
























Achieved Risk Premium for Oil Achieved Risk Premium for Natural Gas
